JUSTICE Thomas: The constitutional right to bear arms in public for self-defense is not “a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.” We know of no other constitutional right that an individual may exercise only after demonstrating to government officers some special need. That is not how the First Amendment works when it comes to unpopular speech or the free exercise of religion. It is not how the Sixth Amendment works when it comes to a defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. And it is not how the Second Amendment works when it comes to public carry for self-defense…
JUSTICE Alito concurring: … Much of the dissent seems designed to obscure the specific question that the Court has decided, and therefore it may be helpful to provide a summary of what we have actually held… today’s decision … holds that a State may not enforce a law, like New York’s Sullivan Law, that effectively prevents its law-abiding residents from carrying a gun for [self-defense].
“A State may not enforce a law, like New York’s Sullivan Law, that effectively prevents its law-abiding residents from carrying a gun for [self-defense].” Bruen prohibits issuing a state Residence Premise License (state RPL) that “effectively prevents its law-abiding residents from carrying a gun for [self-defense].”
Knight intends to cancel his state Residence Premise License (state RPL) and transfer the (4) handguns on his state RPL to his state Carry License (state CL) but 38 - R.C.N.Y. § 5-25 (d)(4)(i) prohibits transferring more than (2) handguns to a state CL. If Knight were to cancel his state RPL the (2) remaining handguns would be confiscated by the NYPD License Division (NYPD LD) to be destroyed. This constitutes a taking of Knight’s personal property without just compensation in violation of due process. Knight only requires a state CL and asks this court why is he prohibited from canceling his state RPL, transferring all (4) of his handguns to his state CL, and adding any new handguns he intends to acquire, possess, and carry in the future to his state CL.
Step (2) of Bruen requires Defendants to provide historical analogues to support the regulations of 38 - R.C.N.Y. § 5-25 which allows the issuance of a state RPL that prohibits the carrying of any arms and a state CL that prohibits the acquisition, possession, and carrying of more than (2) handguns. At step (1) of Bruen the plain text of the 2nd Amendment presumptively protects Knight’s conduct in the acquisition, possession, and carrying of handguns publicly for self-defense. Knight’s 2nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms is a pre-existing right that cannot be granted or taken away by Defendants issuing or canceling a state license.
A state RPL prohibits the carrying of arms and a state CL prohibits the acquisition, possession, and carrying of more than (2) handguns in violation of the right to keep and bear arms. Both licenses prohibit conduct presumptively protected by the plain text of the 2nd Amendment. Defendants are subjecting Knight to the deprivation of his rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, and shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. Knight has pleaded multiple plausible violations of 42 - U.S.C. § 1983 the 2nd Amendment, and the 14th Amendment.
Whereas “a State may not enforce a law, like New York’s Sullivan Law, that effectively prevents its law-abiding residents from carrying a gun for [self-defense]” This court avers that Defendants can enforce 38 - R.C.N.Y. § 5-25 (d)(4)(i) and continue issuing a state RPL that “effectively prohibits its law-abiding residents from carrying a gun for self-defense” which as-applied and facially violates the 2nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms.
Justice Thomas: Applying that new and more stringent standard to the New York proper-cause requirement, Justice Thomas found that the challengers’ desire to carry a handgun in public for self-defense fell squarely within the conduct protected by the 2nd Amendment. The amendment’s text does not distinguish between gun rights in the home and gun rights in public places, Thomas observed. Indeed, he suggested, the 2nd Amendment’s reference to the right to “bear” arms most naturally refers to the right to carry a gun outside the home.
“The amendment’s text does not distinguish between gun rights in the home and gun rights in public places.” Murdock v. Pennsylvania prohibits Defendants from converting a liberty into (2) licenses, and charging (2) fees, by splitting the 2nd Amendment right into (1) state RPL to keep arms and (2) a separate but not equal state CL to bear arms that is as-applied and facially unconstitutional.
The U.S. Supreme Court already held in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham that converting a right into a privilege is unconstitutional.
Justice Thomas: We have little difficulty concluding that it does. Nothing in the Second Amendment’s text draws a home/public distinction with respect to the right to keep and bear arms. As we explained in Heller, the “textual elements” of the Second Amendment’s operative clause— “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”—“guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”
This definition of “bear” naturally encompasses public carry. Most gun owners do not wear a holstered pistol at their hip in their bedroom or while sitting at the dinner table. Although individuals often “keep” firearms in their home, at the ready for self-defense, most do not “bear” (i.e., carry) them in the home beyond moments of actual confrontation. To confine the right to “bear” arms to the home would nullify half of the Second Amendment’s operative protections.
Justice Thomas concurred that “to confine the right to ‘bear’ arms to the home would nullify half of the Second Amendment’s operative protections.” A state RPL is a “restricted type of license” that “confines the right to ‘bear’ arms to the home nullifying half of the 2nd Amendment’s operative protections.” A state RPL prohibits the bearing of any handguns on that license at any time, for any reason, whatsoever as-applied, and facially strikes at the core of the 2nd Amendment right.
To anyone who reviewed the documents, what's your opinion on the judge's two statements?
Conference Transcript - November 09, 2023
MAGISTRATE JUDGE: “But what I really wanted to address was Mr. Knight’s Second Amendment claim as it pertains to what I understand him to be challenging, which is the number of handguns he can have on a carry license. And I understand the City, in their motion papers -- in their motion to dismiss, indicates that the City regulation at issue here, 38 RCNY 5-25(d)(4)(i), doesn’t violate the Second Amendment. But I wanted to talk through that a bit, because my understanding of the landscape post Bruen is that there really is no dispute here that the conduct he’s challenging would be at the core of what the Second Amendment protection is. And my understanding of the test following Bruen is that it would be the government’s burden to identify a historical analogue that would be, not the twin of whatever the city regulation, but something analogous to that dates back, you know, a regulation from the time of the founding or sometime near then. But it struck me from the briefing, from the City’s motion, that it almost was pointing to Knight, and it seemed to shift the burden on him to explain why the regulation was somehow infringing his rights.”
However, after the conference, the judge's Report & Recommendation magically said this.
Report & Recommendation ECF # 40
MAGISTRATE JUDGE: Knight contends that 38 RCNY § 5-25(d)(4)(i) violates the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution and the New York State Civil Rights Law § 4. See Compl. Fifth Cause of Action. Knight alleges that the city regulation restricts and substantially burdens an individual’s right to keep and bear arms and is thus unconstitutional on its face and as applied to Knight and other law-abiding citizens. Id. ¶¶ 53-55. As explained below, Knight has not pled a plausible violation of federal or state law.
See, Case # 2: ECF # 40, 46 & 47: All Case Files Dropbox: cknight.pw/kvnyc
CourtListener Case Files
JUSTICE Alito concurring: … Much of the dissent seems designed to obscure the specific question that the Court has decided, and therefore it may be helpful to provide a summary of what we have actually held… today’s decision … holds that a State may not enforce a law, like New York’s Sullivan Law, that effectively prevents its law-abiding residents from carrying a gun for [self-defense].
“A State may not enforce a law, like New York’s Sullivan Law, that effectively prevents its law-abiding residents from carrying a gun for [self-defense].” Bruen prohibits issuing a state Residence Premise License (state RPL) that “effectively prevents its law-abiding residents from carrying a gun for [self-defense].”
Knight intends to cancel his state Residence Premise License (state RPL) and transfer the (4) handguns on his state RPL to his state Carry License (state CL) but 38 - R.C.N.Y. § 5-25 (d)(4)(i) prohibits transferring more than (2) handguns to a state CL. If Knight were to cancel his state RPL the (2) remaining handguns would be confiscated by the NYPD License Division (NYPD LD) to be destroyed. This constitutes a taking of Knight’s personal property without just compensation in violation of due process. Knight only requires a state CL and asks this court why is he prohibited from canceling his state RPL, transferring all (4) of his handguns to his state CL, and adding any new handguns he intends to acquire, possess, and carry in the future to his state CL.
Step (2) of Bruen requires Defendants to provide historical analogues to support the regulations of 38 - R.C.N.Y. § 5-25 which allows the issuance of a state RPL that prohibits the carrying of any arms and a state CL that prohibits the acquisition, possession, and carrying of more than (2) handguns. At step (1) of Bruen the plain text of the 2nd Amendment presumptively protects Knight’s conduct in the acquisition, possession, and carrying of handguns publicly for self-defense. Knight’s 2nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms is a pre-existing right that cannot be granted or taken away by Defendants issuing or canceling a state license.
A state RPL prohibits the carrying of arms and a state CL prohibits the acquisition, possession, and carrying of more than (2) handguns in violation of the right to keep and bear arms. Both licenses prohibit conduct presumptively protected by the plain text of the 2nd Amendment. Defendants are subjecting Knight to the deprivation of his rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, and shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. Knight has pleaded multiple plausible violations of 42 - U.S.C. § 1983 the 2nd Amendment, and the 14th Amendment.
Whereas “a State may not enforce a law, like New York’s Sullivan Law, that effectively prevents its law-abiding residents from carrying a gun for [self-defense]” This court avers that Defendants can enforce 38 - R.C.N.Y. § 5-25 (d)(4)(i) and continue issuing a state RPL that “effectively prohibits its law-abiding residents from carrying a gun for self-defense” which as-applied and facially violates the 2nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms.
Justice Thomas: Applying that new and more stringent standard to the New York proper-cause requirement, Justice Thomas found that the challengers’ desire to carry a handgun in public for self-defense fell squarely within the conduct protected by the 2nd Amendment. The amendment’s text does not distinguish between gun rights in the home and gun rights in public places, Thomas observed. Indeed, he suggested, the 2nd Amendment’s reference to the right to “bear” arms most naturally refers to the right to carry a gun outside the home.
“The amendment’s text does not distinguish between gun rights in the home and gun rights in public places.” Murdock v. Pennsylvania prohibits Defendants from converting a liberty into (2) licenses, and charging (2) fees, by splitting the 2nd Amendment right into (1) state RPL to keep arms and (2) a separate but not equal state CL to bear arms that is as-applied and facially unconstitutional.
“No state shall convert a liberty into a license, and charge a fee, therefore.” See, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
The U.S. Supreme Court already held in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham that converting a right into a privilege is unconstitutional.
"Whereas if a state converts a right into a privilege, the citizen can ignore the license and fee and engage in the right (liberty) with impunity.” See, Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
Justice Thomas: We have little difficulty concluding that it does. Nothing in the Second Amendment’s text draws a home/public distinction with respect to the right to keep and bear arms. As we explained in Heller, the “textual elements” of the Second Amendment’s operative clause— “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”—“guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”
This definition of “bear” naturally encompasses public carry. Most gun owners do not wear a holstered pistol at their hip in their bedroom or while sitting at the dinner table. Although individuals often “keep” firearms in their home, at the ready for self-defense, most do not “bear” (i.e., carry) them in the home beyond moments of actual confrontation. To confine the right to “bear” arms to the home would nullify half of the Second Amendment’s operative protections.
Justice Thomas concurred that “to confine the right to ‘bear’ arms to the home would nullify half of the Second Amendment’s operative protections.” A state RPL is a “restricted type of license” that “confines the right to ‘bear’ arms to the home nullifying half of the 2nd Amendment’s operative protections.” A state RPL prohibits the bearing of any handguns on that license at any time, for any reason, whatsoever as-applied, and facially strikes at the core of the 2nd Amendment right.
To anyone who reviewed the documents, what's your opinion on the judge's two statements?
Conference Transcript - November 09, 2023
MAGISTRATE JUDGE: “But what I really wanted to address was Mr. Knight’s Second Amendment claim as it pertains to what I understand him to be challenging, which is the number of handguns he can have on a carry license. And I understand the City, in their motion papers -- in their motion to dismiss, indicates that the City regulation at issue here, 38 RCNY 5-25(d)(4)(i), doesn’t violate the Second Amendment. But I wanted to talk through that a bit, because my understanding of the landscape post Bruen is that there really is no dispute here that the conduct he’s challenging would be at the core of what the Second Amendment protection is. And my understanding of the test following Bruen is that it would be the government’s burden to identify a historical analogue that would be, not the twin of whatever the city regulation, but something analogous to that dates back, you know, a regulation from the time of the founding or sometime near then. But it struck me from the briefing, from the City’s motion, that it almost was pointing to Knight, and it seemed to shift the burden on him to explain why the regulation was somehow infringing his rights.”
However, after the conference, the judge's Report & Recommendation magically said this.
Report & Recommendation ECF # 40
MAGISTRATE JUDGE: Knight contends that 38 RCNY § 5-25(d)(4)(i) violates the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution and the New York State Civil Rights Law § 4. See Compl. Fifth Cause of Action. Knight alleges that the city regulation restricts and substantially burdens an individual’s right to keep and bear arms and is thus unconstitutional on its face and as applied to Knight and other law-abiding citizens. Id. ¶¶ 53-55. As explained below, Knight has not pled a plausible violation of federal or state law.
See, Case # 2: ECF # 40, 46 & 47: All Case Files Dropbox: cknight.pw/kvnyc
CourtListener Case Files
