SFC13557
NES Member
"American forces in the Pacific are still concentrated at large bases, principally on Guam and Okinawa, that are highly vulnerable to missile attacks. The U.S. defense budget has loads of money for future capabilities that might materialize in the 2030s but won’t help win a war over Taiwan in this decade. Washington has, rightly, committed tens of billions of dollars in aid to Ukraine yet struggles to find a fraction of that to fund the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, meant to make U.S. forces in the region more resilient and powerful. The fact that China faces an ugly long-term trajectory won’t be much consolation if Beijing nonetheless thrashes Washington and Taipei in the coming fight for dominance of the Western Pacific.
But the situation isn’t hopeless. Amphibious assaults are devilishly difficult, and a full-on invasion of Taiwan would be one of the largest amphibious assaults in history. It would require the PLA to surge hundreds of thousands of troops across the turbulent Taiwan Strait and to seize an island whose geography—mountains, dense jungles, crowded urban environments—is a defender’s dream. A smart, committed defender could turn this operation into a bloody nightmare for invading forces. And doing so doesn’t require defying the laws of physics; it just requires moving—now—to make an invasion look all-too-daunting for even a risk-prone peaking power.
First, the Pentagon can turn the Taiwan Strait into a deathtrap for attacking forces by stocking up on tools that are ready or nearly ready today. This means positioning hordes of missile launchers, armed drones, electronic jammers and sensors at sea and on allied territory near the strait. Instead of waiting for a Chinese assault to start and then surging missile-magnet aircraft carriers into the region, the Pentagon could use what is, in essence, a high-tech minefield to decimate China’s invasion forces and cut their communications links. These diffuse networks of munitions and jammers would be difficult for China to eliminate without starting a regionwide war. They could be installed on virtually anything that floats or flies, including cargo ships, barges and aircraft.
The U.S. also needs to ensure that its military doesn’t have a glass jaw. To prevent China from wrecking forward-stationed American forces at the start of a conflict, the U.S. must scatter those forces across dozens of small operating sites in East Asia. The few big bases that remain must be outfitted with hardened shelters, robust ballistic missile defenses and fake targets to absorb Chinese missiles. Hanging tough also requires dramatically ramping up production of key munitions, so that America has adequate stockpiles and active production lines when the shooting starts. In short, Washington must deprive Beijing of any hope of landing a knockout blow—and thereby confront it with the prospect of a long, grueling war that could threaten the CCP’s hold on power at home.
Another priority is for Washington to help Taiwan help itself. Taipei has smart plans to stock up on mobile missile launchers, mines and radars; harden its communications infrastructure; enlarge its army and ground-force reserves; and otherwise prepare to inflict sky-high costs on an aggressor. But Taipei isn’t implementing these plans fast enough. If Taiwan doesn’t pick up the pace, there is nothing the U.S. can do to save it. If Taiwan redoubles its efforts, however, then America should provide money, hardware and expertise to make the island a tougher target.
The U.S. can help by donating ammunition and sensors, subsidizing Taiwanese procurement of missile launchers and mine layers, matching Taiwanese investments in vital military infrastructure and expanding joint training on crucial defense missions. American special operations forces can help Taiwan prepare for a lethal insurgency against Chinese occupiers, the threat of which may help deter an invasion in the first place. Just as important, Washington can undertake more complex exercises with Taiwan’s military—and quietly station larger contingents of trainers and special operations forces on the island—to ensure that the two countries can act as a real alliance if a conflict ignites.
The U.S. also needs to exploit the enemy’s weaknesses. Because the PLA hasn’t fought a major war since invading Vietnam in 1979, it hasn’t tested its modern command-and-control processes under fire. By developing the ability—through cyberattacks and related means—to inject confusion into military communications networks, the Pentagon can make Chinese officials wonder how glitchy their forces will be in combat. And by rehearsing a distant blockade of Chinese energy imports, America can threaten to turn any protracted conflict into an economic disaster for Beijing.
Finally, the U.S. must make China realize that a Taiwan war could go big as well as long. The more friends America can bring into the fight, the less appetizing that fight will look to Beijing.
The PLA may talk big about crushing Japan if Tokyo helps Washington in a crisis, but it can’t relish the prospect of fighting a global superpower and its mightiest regional ally. The Indian and Australian navies could help Washington choke off Beijing’s oil imports as they transit the Malacca Strait. Key European powers—especially the United Kingdom and France—can contribute submarines or surface combatants; more important, they can impose painful technological and economic sanctions. Sanctioning China obviously would be more difficult than sanctioning Russia—which is why America and its allies need to plan these punishments now, before a crisis starts.
If Washington can credibly promise to turn a fight over Taiwan into a showdown between China and the world’s most advanced democracies, that is a strategic price even Xi Jinping might not want to pay. Indeed, the best way to avoid a looming war in Asia is to make clear that Beijing cannot win at anything like an acceptable cost.
The crisis over Speaker Pelosi’s visit is just the beginning. The U.S. is entering the most crucial phase of its rivalry with China, when the risk of war is highest and decisions made, or not made, will reverberate for decades. America can win a protracted competition against a formidable but faltering China, but only if it braces now for the very real possibility of a dramatic attack on Taiwan."
Mr. Brands is the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Beckley is associate professor of political science at Tufts University and a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. This essay is adapted from their new book, “Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China,” which will be published by W.W. Norton on Aug. 16.
But the situation isn’t hopeless. Amphibious assaults are devilishly difficult, and a full-on invasion of Taiwan would be one of the largest amphibious assaults in history. It would require the PLA to surge hundreds of thousands of troops across the turbulent Taiwan Strait and to seize an island whose geography—mountains, dense jungles, crowded urban environments—is a defender’s dream. A smart, committed defender could turn this operation into a bloody nightmare for invading forces. And doing so doesn’t require defying the laws of physics; it just requires moving—now—to make an invasion look all-too-daunting for even a risk-prone peaking power.
First, the Pentagon can turn the Taiwan Strait into a deathtrap for attacking forces by stocking up on tools that are ready or nearly ready today. This means positioning hordes of missile launchers, armed drones, electronic jammers and sensors at sea and on allied territory near the strait. Instead of waiting for a Chinese assault to start and then surging missile-magnet aircraft carriers into the region, the Pentagon could use what is, in essence, a high-tech minefield to decimate China’s invasion forces and cut their communications links. These diffuse networks of munitions and jammers would be difficult for China to eliminate without starting a regionwide war. They could be installed on virtually anything that floats or flies, including cargo ships, barges and aircraft.
The U.S. also needs to ensure that its military doesn’t have a glass jaw. To prevent China from wrecking forward-stationed American forces at the start of a conflict, the U.S. must scatter those forces across dozens of small operating sites in East Asia. The few big bases that remain must be outfitted with hardened shelters, robust ballistic missile defenses and fake targets to absorb Chinese missiles. Hanging tough also requires dramatically ramping up production of key munitions, so that America has adequate stockpiles and active production lines when the shooting starts. In short, Washington must deprive Beijing of any hope of landing a knockout blow—and thereby confront it with the prospect of a long, grueling war that could threaten the CCP’s hold on power at home.
Another priority is for Washington to help Taiwan help itself. Taipei has smart plans to stock up on mobile missile launchers, mines and radars; harden its communications infrastructure; enlarge its army and ground-force reserves; and otherwise prepare to inflict sky-high costs on an aggressor. But Taipei isn’t implementing these plans fast enough. If Taiwan doesn’t pick up the pace, there is nothing the U.S. can do to save it. If Taiwan redoubles its efforts, however, then America should provide money, hardware and expertise to make the island a tougher target.
The U.S. can help by donating ammunition and sensors, subsidizing Taiwanese procurement of missile launchers and mine layers, matching Taiwanese investments in vital military infrastructure and expanding joint training on crucial defense missions. American special operations forces can help Taiwan prepare for a lethal insurgency against Chinese occupiers, the threat of which may help deter an invasion in the first place. Just as important, Washington can undertake more complex exercises with Taiwan’s military—and quietly station larger contingents of trainers and special operations forces on the island—to ensure that the two countries can act as a real alliance if a conflict ignites.
The U.S. also needs to exploit the enemy’s weaknesses. Because the PLA hasn’t fought a major war since invading Vietnam in 1979, it hasn’t tested its modern command-and-control processes under fire. By developing the ability—through cyberattacks and related means—to inject confusion into military communications networks, the Pentagon can make Chinese officials wonder how glitchy their forces will be in combat. And by rehearsing a distant blockade of Chinese energy imports, America can threaten to turn any protracted conflict into an economic disaster for Beijing.
Finally, the U.S. must make China realize that a Taiwan war could go big as well as long. The more friends America can bring into the fight, the less appetizing that fight will look to Beijing.
The PLA may talk big about crushing Japan if Tokyo helps Washington in a crisis, but it can’t relish the prospect of fighting a global superpower and its mightiest regional ally. The Indian and Australian navies could help Washington choke off Beijing’s oil imports as they transit the Malacca Strait. Key European powers—especially the United Kingdom and France—can contribute submarines or surface combatants; more important, they can impose painful technological and economic sanctions. Sanctioning China obviously would be more difficult than sanctioning Russia—which is why America and its allies need to plan these punishments now, before a crisis starts.
If Washington can credibly promise to turn a fight over Taiwan into a showdown between China and the world’s most advanced democracies, that is a strategic price even Xi Jinping might not want to pay. Indeed, the best way to avoid a looming war in Asia is to make clear that Beijing cannot win at anything like an acceptable cost.
The crisis over Speaker Pelosi’s visit is just the beginning. The U.S. is entering the most crucial phase of its rivalry with China, when the risk of war is highest and decisions made, or not made, will reverberate for decades. America can win a protracted competition against a formidable but faltering China, but only if it braces now for the very real possibility of a dramatic attack on Taiwan."
Mr. Brands is the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Beckley is associate professor of political science at Tufts University and a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. This essay is adapted from their new book, “Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China,” which will be published by W.W. Norton on Aug. 16.
