Chevron deference is dead!!!

Ok, so moving forward then? No more promulgated shit?
The way I read it, it allows courts greater latitude in shitting on an agency's regulatory authority vs "well thats what X says it is so it means whatever they say"
 
Here's a thought: there were many 2A cases over the past 20+ years that were ruled using Chevron difference. Can those cases get resurrected? File an appeal to rehear the cases in light of the new ruling?
 
Here's a thought: there were many 2A cases over the past 20+ years that were ruled using Chevron difference. Can those cases get resurrected? File an appeal to rehear the cases in light of the new ruling?
I'm intrigued what this means for any ruling...is everything fair game right now
 
This is better news than the stupid debate but most people have no idea what it means.

I dont think many people understand the depth snd impact this has and how f’d the system had got unless you were impacted by it.
I am one of those that don't understand what this means. Is there a simple example of what was and what will be now that this has been killed? Thanks
 
Does this make all bureaucratic edicts void now?
No.

One can take entire courses on the law of Administrative Agencies. Or wade through hundreds of pages of Gellhorn & Byse. Here is the short version – with all of the vices of short versions.

Agencies are usually authorized to issue (“promulgate”) regulations.

Agency regulations come in two types (depending on the authority granted in the Agency’s organic statutes):

“Interpretive Regulations” tell the world how the Agency interprets some aspect of a regulation. They tell us in the process how the Agency will administer its authority, i.e., what positions it will take in court and what positions it will not take. However, Interpretive Regulations do not make law and are not binding on anyone. If the regulation is challenged in Court, the Court will determine for itself whether the interpretation is or is not a correct reading of the statute.

“Legislative Regulations” actually authorize an agency to “make law.” Since the legislative power is, under our Constitution, limited to Congress, the extent to which agencies can be authorized to make policy decisions is limited; sometimes, and at least originally, Legislative Regulations were referred to as “fill in the blank” regulations.

An example: Congress is concerned about people driving too fast in national parks. But it doesn’t want to set a single, one-size-fits-all speed limit, because the terrain and road design varies in different parks or parts of parks. So it passes a statute creating the National Park Speeding Agency, and in the statute it authorizes the NPSA to promulgate speed limit regulations for various parks, telling it to take into account terrain, sight distances, road width and grade, and a bunch of other parameters.

If a Legislative Regulation is challenged in Court, the legal issue is not whether the Agency’s decision is “right” or “wrong,” but whether it is a rational application of the criteria specified in the Agency’s statute, and is backed up by at least some rationally-based evidence. If so, the Legislative Regulation is binding on people, and violations of it can be penalized.

As you may have observed, BATFE's organic statute authorizes it to promulgate only Interpretive Regulations, not also Legislative Regulations. As a result, the issue in Cargill was whether a bump stock made a semi-auto into a “machine gun” as defined by Congress, not whether doing so was good policy or a reasonable application of some guiding criteria.

To some extent, and when all of this first came about (about 1900 with respect to meat packing safety), it made sense. For a whole bunch of rational reasons it wouldn't be practical for all of the Senators and Congressmen to go wandering around mid-west slaughter houses and pig pens. The problem is that a benign baby grew into an untamed monster. On the one hand, it was altogether to easy for elected Senators and Congressmen to delegate the responsibility for making policy judgments to someone else – and thus to duck the wrath of constituents who didn’t like the rules that came out. Simultaneously, it became all too tempting for people in the Executive Branch to avoid Congress altogether and make new laws without the hassle of having to get enough people in Congress to agree.

That is why today, while our Constitution refers to three branches of government, we actually have four. The people who run the Fourth Branch are not elected and don’t have to worry about getting reelected, only about ticking off their boss.

Superimposed on this is one other issue. Today it is common for people who can’t get something they want through Congress – or who for whatever reason don’t want to try – to complain about “Congressional inaction.” In point of fact, the framers of our Constitution were almost as afraid of a national legislature as they had been of a British king. If someone comes up with a bright idea that isn’t so bright that they can get the required votes in Congress to enact it, and it therefore doesn’t get enacted, that is exactly what our framers intended and desired.

Sorry for the lecture, I’ll go back to sleep now.
 
This decision really makes practicing CPAs like me and other practitioners looking to the IRS for interpretation of a tax provision and leaves the answer to a judge who may not have any tax experience whatsoever. IRS interpretation allowed for better planning and strategy and even finding loopholes!

Now a similar case could be in two very different jurisdictions. Do you recommend paying now and get tagged with penalties and interest later (depending on timing) or do they hope for a massive refund with accrued interest to come back to them while something winds its way through the courts and is decided in their favor?

I appreciate what the decision means for other things, but it’s incredibly broad and is going to bog down already overloaded court dockets.
This sounds like a reason to throw out the tax law and rewrite it so it can be understood and not twisted and manipulated. The result shouldn't be more that a couple hundred pages.
Then it wouldn't need constant interpretation, and there would be a big decline in tax lawyers too.
 
SEC v. Jarkesky is also interesting. It looks like it deprives agencies of the right run their own judiciary that has full and final authority over the levey of punishment in terms of fines, as it deprives defendants of the right for trial buy jury.

If I understand this correctly, it means that someone accused of violating USPS hazmat regulations (mailing lithium batteries or live ammo for example), or assessed a fine by the TSA has the right to have their offense adjudicated in a jury trial rather than an agency's administrative hearing.
 
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Give us some examples?
MA AWB case that was ruled constitutional using Chevron. It was appealed all the way up to SCOTUS but was refused because, at the time, they wanted to take Bruen. Now, there is an opportunity to request re-hearing with SCOTUS due to an invalid decision using Chevron. SCOTUS will kick it back down and invalidate the lower court decision. The lower circuit will have no choice but to overturn the AWB just like it did with "may issue" after Bruen decision.

Magazine capacity from RI was another one. Chevron was used to rule on almost all 2A cases that were argued in the first district court.


P.S. You may want to refer to RKG's post as I may have misinterpreted how MA AWB was argued by the sate. RKG's post
 
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