HooVooLoo
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I searched high and low, and finally found what being in control of a firearm really means legally, but only through caselaw. It is not a Black's Law dictionary-type-definition in MA, but it will suffice. Was found in the AG's amicus brief on Commonwealth v. Runyan, which is still under argument.
2. Section 131L’s plain language permits an owner or other lawfully authorized
user to keep an operable firearm for self-defense in the home.
...§131L’s requires only that firearms be securely stored; it does not prohibit any possession of handguns whatsoever in the home. Moreover, § 131L’s plain language includes an exemption that allows owners and other lawfully authorized users to use firearms for self-defense in the home. More specifically, § 131L(a)’s second sentence exempts firearms “carried by or under the control of the owner or other lawfully authorized user” from storage.
(“Where the language of a statute is plain, it must be interpreted in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words. In particular, absent clear indication to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its ‘ordinary lexical meaning.’”
Commonwealth v. Biagiotti, 451 Mass. 599, 601-02 (2008)).
The plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in § 131L(a)’s second sentence is that the section’s safe-storage provisions are inapplicable whenever a firearm is “carried by or under the control of the owner or other lawfully authorized user.”
This straightforward reading of the statute is confirmed by the Legislature’s use of the phrases “carried by” and “under the control of.” Both of these phrases have established meanings that are sufficiently broad to permit the use of a firearm for self-defense in the home. The phrase “carried by” indicates that the exemption applies whenever the firearm is in the hands or on the person of the owner or other lawfully authorized user... Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 134 (1998) (“‘Carry’ implies personal agency and some degree of possession[.]”).
In a similar context, the Court has stated that “‘[c]arrying’ a firearm occurs when a defendant knowingly has more than momentary possession of a working firearm and moves it from one place to another.” Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 407 Mass. 553, 558 (1990) (quoting Commonwealth v. Seay, 376 Mass. 735, 737 (1978)) (defining “carrying” for purposes of G.L. c. 269, § 10(a)).
This definition is sufficiently broad to permit an owner or other lawfully authorized user, who is carrying a firearm, to keep the firearm available for self-defense in the home.
The phrase “under the control of” is even broader. “‘Control’ requires that one exercise dominion over a particular item.” Commonwealth v. Gray, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 296, 299 (1977).
Individuals generally have dominion or control over objects that are on their body or within their reach. In the context of searches incident to arrest, for instance, the Supreme Court has construed the term “immediate control” to mean the “area from within which [the arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon[.]” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1961); see also Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 420 Mass. 542, 554 (1995) (same).
Ordinarily, this zone of control extends to any weapons within the arrestee’s reach. See Alvarado, 420 Mass. at 554 (“A search incident to arrest is limited to the area within the arrestee’s immediate control as its purpose is to protect the arresting officer from weapons . . . , which may be within the arrestee’s reach… Riley v. Kentucky, 120 S.W.3d 622, 629 (Ky. 2003) (defendant properly found in control of 2 firearms “which were laying in an unobstructed location only six to eight feet from where he was sitting”).
Safe-storage statutes in other states shed further light on the meaning of the phrase “under the control of.” See Seideman v. City of Newton, 452 Mass. 472, 478 (2008) (“We derive the words’ usual and accepted meanings from sources presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as their use in other legal contexts[.]”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977)).
California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin all have safe-storage laws that, like § 131L(a), provide exemptions for when the firearm is carried by the owner or “within such close proximity” to the owner that the owner can readily retrieve the firearm. Thus, like the standard applicable to searches incident to arrest, other states’ safe-storage statutes define control in terms of what is or is not within the owner’s reach.
These legal definitions of control were available when § 131L was enacted and, thus, presumably known to the Legislature… Given the similarity of statutory purpose and language, the phrase “under the control of” as used in § 131L(a) is properly interpreted in the same manner as these generally-accepted legal definitions.
Accordingly, §131L(a)’s “under the control of” exemption applies whenever a firearm is in such close proximity to the owner or other lawfully authorized user that it can be readily reached and retrieved for that individual’s use, including for self-defense in the home.
In sum…§ 131L’s plain language demonstrates that… So long as a firearm is on or in close proximity to the owner or other lawfully authorized user’s person such that it can be readily retrieved, the firearm may be kept unsecured and fully operable and, thus, immediately available for self-defense in the home. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822; Commonwealth v.Cantelli, No. 08-422, 2009 WL 1514958, *2 (Mass. Sup. Ct. May 29, 2009) (Sanders, J.)
*whew*
2. Section 131L’s plain language permits an owner or other lawfully authorized
user to keep an operable firearm for self-defense in the home.
...§131L’s requires only that firearms be securely stored; it does not prohibit any possession of handguns whatsoever in the home. Moreover, § 131L’s plain language includes an exemption that allows owners and other lawfully authorized users to use firearms for self-defense in the home. More specifically, § 131L(a)’s second sentence exempts firearms “carried by or under the control of the owner or other lawfully authorized user” from storage.
(“Where the language of a statute is plain, it must be interpreted in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words. In particular, absent clear indication to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its ‘ordinary lexical meaning.’”
Commonwealth v. Biagiotti, 451 Mass. 599, 601-02 (2008)).
The plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in § 131L(a)’s second sentence is that the section’s safe-storage provisions are inapplicable whenever a firearm is “carried by or under the control of the owner or other lawfully authorized user.”
This straightforward reading of the statute is confirmed by the Legislature’s use of the phrases “carried by” and “under the control of.” Both of these phrases have established meanings that are sufficiently broad to permit the use of a firearm for self-defense in the home. The phrase “carried by” indicates that the exemption applies whenever the firearm is in the hands or on the person of the owner or other lawfully authorized user... Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 134 (1998) (“‘Carry’ implies personal agency and some degree of possession[.]”).
In a similar context, the Court has stated that “‘[c]arrying’ a firearm occurs when a defendant knowingly has more than momentary possession of a working firearm and moves it from one place to another.” Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 407 Mass. 553, 558 (1990) (quoting Commonwealth v. Seay, 376 Mass. 735, 737 (1978)) (defining “carrying” for purposes of G.L. c. 269, § 10(a)).
This definition is sufficiently broad to permit an owner or other lawfully authorized user, who is carrying a firearm, to keep the firearm available for self-defense in the home.
The phrase “under the control of” is even broader. “‘Control’ requires that one exercise dominion over a particular item.” Commonwealth v. Gray, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 296, 299 (1977).
Individuals generally have dominion or control over objects that are on their body or within their reach. In the context of searches incident to arrest, for instance, the Supreme Court has construed the term “immediate control” to mean the “area from within which [the arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon[.]” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1961); see also Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 420 Mass. 542, 554 (1995) (same).
Ordinarily, this zone of control extends to any weapons within the arrestee’s reach. See Alvarado, 420 Mass. at 554 (“A search incident to arrest is limited to the area within the arrestee’s immediate control as its purpose is to protect the arresting officer from weapons . . . , which may be within the arrestee’s reach… Riley v. Kentucky, 120 S.W.3d 622, 629 (Ky. 2003) (defendant properly found in control of 2 firearms “which were laying in an unobstructed location only six to eight feet from where he was sitting”).
Safe-storage statutes in other states shed further light on the meaning of the phrase “under the control of.” See Seideman v. City of Newton, 452 Mass. 472, 478 (2008) (“We derive the words’ usual and accepted meanings from sources presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as their use in other legal contexts[.]”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977)).
California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin all have safe-storage laws that, like § 131L(a), provide exemptions for when the firearm is carried by the owner or “within such close proximity” to the owner that the owner can readily retrieve the firearm. Thus, like the standard applicable to searches incident to arrest, other states’ safe-storage statutes define control in terms of what is or is not within the owner’s reach.
These legal definitions of control were available when § 131L was enacted and, thus, presumably known to the Legislature… Given the similarity of statutory purpose and language, the phrase “under the control of” as used in § 131L(a) is properly interpreted in the same manner as these generally-accepted legal definitions.
Accordingly, §131L(a)’s “under the control of” exemption applies whenever a firearm is in such close proximity to the owner or other lawfully authorized user that it can be readily reached and retrieved for that individual’s use, including for self-defense in the home.
In sum…§ 131L’s plain language demonstrates that… So long as a firearm is on or in close proximity to the owner or other lawfully authorized user’s person such that it can be readily retrieved, the firearm may be kept unsecured and fully operable and, thus, immediately available for self-defense in the home. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822; Commonwealth v.Cantelli, No. 08-422, 2009 WL 1514958, *2 (Mass. Sup. Ct. May 29, 2009) (Sanders, J.)
*whew*
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