From the opinion:
With the respectful consideration and benefit of Bruen, we now uphold the judgment below. The assault weapons at issue fall outside the ambit of protection offered by the Second Amendment because, in essence, they are military-style weapons designed for sustained combat operations that are ill-suited and disproportionate to the need for self defense. Moreover, the Maryland law fits comfortably within our nation’s tradition of firearms regulation. It is but another example of a state regulating excessively dangerous weapons once their incompatibility with a lawful and safe society becomes apparent, while nonetheless preserving avenues for armed self-defense.
For these reasons, we decline to wield the Constitution to declare that military-style armaments which have become primary instruments of mass killing and terrorist attacks in the United States are beyond the reach of our nation’s democratic processes. In so holding, we offer no view on how a state should regulate firearms. Nor do we do anything to impose Maryland’s regulations upon other states. We do hold, however, that Maryland was well within its constitutional prerogative to legislate as it did. We therefore reject the challenges of appellants and affirm the judgment of the district court.
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The upshot is that the text of the Second Amendment, like the text of other constitutional provisions, must be interpreted against its historical and legal backdrop. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 25 (endorsing “reliance on history to inform the meaning of constitutional text—especially text meant to codify a pre-existing right”). What we must do under Bruen, then, is assess the historical scope of the right to keep and bear arms to determine whether the text of the Second Amendment encompasses the right to possess the assault weapons at issue. See Price, No. 22-4609, slip op. at 12–13 (majority opinion)(“[W]e can only properly apply step one of the Bruen framework by looking to the historical scope of the Second Amendment right.”).