So I have my interpretation as does everyone else. What is the consensus on “lawfully possessing” a post 2016 ar that is recently completed from a stripped reciever? It would seem somewhat clear to me a lower is not a firearm (currently) and is lawfully possessed today. If it is then assembled into a rifle today or going forward is there any serious danger to efa10 it. Until 10/23 that would seem to be the law of the land with the 7 day rule. Or just wait to assemble it and see how it shakes out?
My personal opinion or my opinion of what the 1st Circuit and lower will apply?
My opinion is that while Healy as the AG was within her authority to clarify an ambiguity of law at the time given Chervon doctrine's application, she did not have authority in this matter as there was no ongoing ambiguity in the application of the law. Massachusetts's legislature was perfectly clear in incorporating the federal assault weapons ban into Mass code.
Mass Chapt 140 Sect 121 said:
Section 121. As used in sections 122 to 131Y, inclusive, the following words shall, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, have the following meanings:—
''Ammunition'', cartridges or cartridge cases, primers (igniter), bullets or propellant powder designed for use in any firearm, rifle or shotgun. The term ''ammunition'' shall also mean tear gas cartridges.
''Assault weapon'', shall have the same meaning as a semiautomatic assault weapon as defined in the federal Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. section 921(a)(30) as appearing in such section on September 13, 1994, and shall include, but not be limited to, any of the weapons, or copies or duplicates of the weapons, of any caliber, known as: (i) Avtomat Kalashnikov (AK) (all models); (ii) Action Arms Israeli Military Industries UZI and Galil; (iii) Beretta Ar70 (SC–70); (iv) Colt AR–15; (v) Fabrique National FN/FAL, FN/LAR and FNC; (vi) SWD M–10, M–11, M–11/9 and M–12; (vi) Steyr AUG; (vii) INTRATEC TEC–9, TEC–DC9 and TEC–22; and (viii) revolving cylinder shotguns, such as, or similar to, the Street Sweeper and Striker 12; provided, however, that the term assault weapon shall not include: (i) any of the weapons, or replicas or duplicates of such weapons, specified in appendix A to 18 U.S.C. section 922 as appearing in such appendix on September 13, 1994, as such weapons were manufactured on October 1, 1993; (ii) any weapon that is operated by manual bolt, pump, lever or slide action; (iii) any weapon that has been rendered permanently inoperable or otherwise rendered permanently unable to be designated a semiautomatic assault weapon; (iv) any weapon that was manufactured prior to the year 1899; (v) any weapon that is an antique or relic, theatrical prop or other weapon that is not capable of firing a projectile and which is not intended for use as a functional weapon and cannot be readily modified through a combination of available parts into an operable assault weapon; (vi) any semiautomatic rifle that cannot accept a detachable magazine that holds more than five rounds of ammunition; or (vii) any semiautomatic shotgun that cannot hold more than five rounds of ammunition in a fixed or detachable magazine.
The bolded part calls out the official meaning of the text to have the same meaning as federal law - a law that was clarified by higher authority than the Mass AG. Therefore while she has authority to clarify ambiguities, there was no remaining ambiguity of law about copies and duplicates - what was federally legal and compliant was abundantly clear.
Therefore, the 7/20/16 declaration was a wish list of what she preferred dealers and citizens to follow but did not factually change a thing.
However, I am not the one that forces people into cages at gunpoint for
malum prohibitum offenses.
The 1st circuit and below are going to interpret Loper as Chevron still has jurisdiction over her past declaration, therefore she had the authority as the regulating official to make a legally binding clarification of an ambiguity of law - which means every single AR platform firearm was illegal to possess or sell in Mass from 94 forward unless possessed prior to 13 Sept 1994.
Under that interpretation, building an AR today and registering on an eFA-10 is an admission of sufficient facts to the offense of possession of a banned assault weapon.
The truth is that those questions are irrelevant and will never be answered - the relevant question is can the commonwealth ban the people from keeping and bearing an arm in common use?
That answer is clearly no
The we ask if the AR platform is in common use - Neither Heller or Bruen answer this question. However, we do have some insight as to a threshold of what constitutes common use in
Cataeno
So lets explore the arguments used in attempt to justify the ban
AR platform rifles are a modern development the founding fathers could not have foreseen:
In so doing, the court concluded that stun guns are “unusual” because they are “a thoroughly modern invention.” 470 Mass., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at693–694. By equating “unusual” with “in common use at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment,” the court’s second explanation is the same as the first; it is inconsistent with Heller for the same reason
AR platform rifles are an instrument of war:
The court also opined that a weapon’s unusualness depends on whether “it is a weapon of warfare to be used by the militia.” 470 Mass., at 780, 26 N. E. 3d, at 693. It asserted that we followed such an approach in Miller and “approved its use in Heller.” 470 Mass., at 780, 26N. E. 3d, at 693. But Heller actually said that it would be a “startling reading” of Miller to conclude that “only those weapons useful in warfare are protected.” 554 U. S., at624. Instead, Miller and Heller recognized that militia members traditionally reported for duty carrying “the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home,” and that the Second Amendment therefore protects such weapons as a class, regardless of any particular weapon’s suitability for military use.
Weapons in common use are protected regardless of suitability, or lack thereof, for military use.
AR platform rifles are unusually dangerous:
As to “dangerous,” the court below held that a weapon is “dangerous per se” if it is “ ‘designed and constructed to produce death or great bodily harm’ and ‘for the purpose of bodily assault or defense.’” 470 Mass., at 779, 26 N. E. 3d,at 692 (quoting Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296,303, 402 N. E. 2d 1051, 1056 (1980)). That test may be appropriate for applying statutes criminalizing assault with a dangerous weapon. See ibid., 402 N. E. 2d, at 1056.But it cannot be used to identify arms that fall outside the Second Amendment. First, the relative dangerousness of a weapon is irrelevant when the weapon belongs to a class of arms commonly used for lawful purposes.
So now we know that a modern arm, even one of military use with a high degree of dangerousness, is protected as long as it is commonly used for lawful purposes.
So what is "common" - while this is actually a non-sequitur since the word "common" describes the use not the item, I will still explore this in reference to ARs
the pertinent Second Amendment inquiry is whether stun guns are commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes today. The Supreme Judicial Court offered only a cursory discussion of that question, noting that the “‘number of Tasers and stun guns is dwarfed by the number of firearms.’” 470 Mass., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 693. This observation may be true, but it is beside the point. Otherwise, a State would be free to ban all weapons except handguns, because “handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home.” Heller, supra, at 629.
The more relevant statistic is that “[h]undreds of thousands of Tasers and stun guns have been sold to private citizens,” who it appears may lawfully possess them in 45States. People v. Yanna, 297 Mich. App. 137, 144, 824N. W. 2d 241, 245 (2012) (holding Michigan stun gun ban unconstitutional); see Volokh, Nonlethal Self-Defense,(Almost Entirely) Nonlethal Weapons, and the Rights To Keep and Bear Arms and Defend Life, 62 Stan. L. Rev.199, 244 (2009) (citing stun gun bans in seven States);Wis. Stat. §941.295 (Supp. 2015) (amended Wisconsin law permitting stun gun possession); see also Brief in Opposition 11 (acknowledging that “approximately 200,000 civilians owned stun guns” as of 2009). While less popular than handguns, stun guns are widely owned and accepted as a legitimate means of self-defense across the country. Massachusetts’ categorical ban of such weapons therefore violates the Second Amendment.
So while the Supreme Court doesn't give us a lower threshold of what is "widely owned" we know that 200k definitively meets that threshold. And with a minimum of 25 million AR platform firearms in circulation, they easily dwarf tazers by a factor of 125x the popularity.
However, the test is not if a weapon is common, it is if it is
commonly used. So we must ask ourselves if the platform is commonly put to lawful or illegal purpose and what threshold of unlawful used withdraws protection.
With approximately 11k non-suicide homicides by firearm in the US annually, we can simply ask how many are committed normally by rifles as the AR platform is most commonly configured. The answer is nominally less than 400 or approximately 4% with long guns in general. As ARs are a subset of that class, they cannot be seen as "commonly used" for unlawful purpose. And that is backed by Heller's assertion that handguns cannot be banned even though they are the tool of the majority of crimes committed with aid of a firearm of any type.
In total, the AR platform firearm is clearly among those arms protected by the second if one simply takes the time to read and understand the case law surrounding the right to keep and bear arms. And that a court may contradict this fact because they pose some acute social risk is simply not allowed:
We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding “interest-balancing” approach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.