Probably not a good idea in this commie state.
Seriously?
You seem lost. Allow me to point you in the direction of your pasture.
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Probably not a good idea in this commie state.
i walk outside with drop legs, chest rigs, gun cases, range bags all the time.
no one even notices. maybe they've become desensitized to me.
Sorry, my mistake, like I said though, EFF'D up laws. It may as well be a felony if it's a lifetime DQ. [/sarc]
Correction (from below): I thought that any misdemeanor with greater than 1 year was considered a felony -- it turns out that it must be a misdemeanor with greater than 2 years. Of course a felony with "1 year and a day" is worse than a misdemeanor up to 2 years. All quite messed up.
Btw: In the "old days" a felony was something you could be executed for. Anything without a capital punishment possibility was a misdemeanor.
i walk outside with drop legs, chest rigs, gun cases, range bags all the time.
no one even notices. maybe they've become desensitized to me.
my granddaughter is a Halloween baby.
On her 16th birthday, she had a Halloween party to celebrate.
She dressed as a pirate. I gave her a .50 cal cap and ball pistol to stick in her sash (belt).
Her friends were amazed that she was carrying a real pistol. She didn't go out trick or treating but I doubt anyone would have said anything.
3. The firearm conviction. General Laws c. 269, § 10(a), prohibits the unauthorized possession, or control in a vehicle, of a firearm while not at home or work. General Laws c. 140, § 121, defines the word "firearm" as a pistol, revolver, or other weapon capable of discharging a shot and having a barrel less that sixteen inches in length. See Commonwealth v. Sampson, 383 Mass. 750 , 753 (1981); Commonwealth v. Nieves, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 1 , 2 (1997). The Commonwealth presented testimony of a State police officer assigned to the firearms identification section that showed that the weapon in question was capable of discharging a bullet and had a barrel length of less than sixteen inches. During cross-examination, the witness acknowledged that he did not know whether the weapon in question was manufactured prior to 1899.
It is the defendant's argument that if the weapon in issue had been manufactured in or prior to 1899, it was not a "firearm" within the scope of G. L. c. 269, § 10(a). He claims that the judge was in error in refusing to allow him to make this argument to the jury and to instruct the jury accordingly. The defendant bases this argument on that part of G. L. c. 140, § 121, as in effect at all times here relevant, that provides that "any firearm, rifle or shotgun including any firearm, rifle or shotgun with matchlock, flintlock, percussion cap, or similar type of ignition system manufactured in or before eighteen hundred and ninety-eight" is, in effect, exempt from the definition of a firearm and therefore, he contends, outside the scope of G. L. c. 269, § 10(a). The argument is contrary to the legislative purpose of G. L. c. 269, § 10(a), and the clear and unambiguous language of G. L. c. 140, § 121.
In the first instance, § 10(a) "seeks to control the carrying of firearms so as to 'protect the public from the potential danger incident to . . . [their] unlawful possession.' " Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904 , 911 (1976), quoting from Commonwealth v. Bartholomew, 326 Mass. 218 , 219 (1950). See Commonwealth v. Seay, 376 Mass. 735 , 743 (1978). Secondly, the cited exemption provided for in G. L. c. 140, § 121, expressly and unambiguously limits itself to G. L. c. 140, §§ 122 to 129D, inclusive, and §§ 131, 131A, 131B and 131E. [Note 4] This limitation is consistent with the purpose of G. L. c. 269, § 10(a). See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. at 911. See also Opinion of the Attorney General, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12, at 95-96 (1975). [Note 5]
We see no error in the judge's rulings relating to the defendant's misplaced reliance upon G. L. c. 140, § 121.