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Secure COMMS

@MaverickNH , do you participate in those or are you just passing along the info. I'm fairly new to actually getting on the radio and don't necessarily understand what most nets are for, but that seems interesting. It looks like we missed this month's nets for AmRRON, but I'd at least like to check it out and give it a listen and maybe check in.
 
@MaverickNH , do you participate in those or are you just passing along the info. I'm fairly new to actually getting on the radio and don't necessarily understand what most nets are for, but that seems interesting. It looks like we missed this month's nets for AmRRON, but I'd at least like to check it out and give it a listen and maybe check in.
I’ve done ARES for a few years but am just venturing into this area of Emcomms. I just applied to join AmRRon - dunno their inside story. Any group that mentions Oathkeepers on their About page is probably on DHS/DOJ watchlists.I learned of them when purchasing a PreppComm MMX-20/40/80 MMX QRP Morse Code Transceiver | Texting on HF via Keyboard! That unit has gotten a lot of reviews with little mentioned about their connection with AmRRon.

Nets are a mix of social and practical radio/comms - many mostly one or the other. My local club net is a 7pm 2m repeater checkin where people just chat about their day briefly. ARES is about drill and training exercise, with live/web meetings for training.

Prepping in any form can be boring as hell, getting ready for something that never comes. Good Emcomms programs provide a mix of social and practical engagement to at least keep it interesting.
 
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I've heard a few nets like you describe, most are: "K1ABC, commercial power, no traffic" times the number of people checking in. The other day I actually heard someone with traffic but the guy was literally. dropping. the. repeater. between. every. word. and. it. was. annoying. a. f. and I never figured out what the traffic was.

The Amrron word of the week sounds interesting. Like playing operator as a kid.
 
I've heard a few nets like you describe, most are: "K1ABC, commercial power, no traffic" times the number of people checking in. The other day I actually heard someone with traffic but the guy was literally. dropping. the. repeater. between. every. word. and. it. was. annoying. a. f. and I never figured out what the traffic was.
Before you jump to conclusions,
are you capable of distinguishing
the sound of someone periodically releasing their PTT
from the sound of someone being jammed by malicious QRM
that pulses a strong carrier at the repeater?
 
Before you jump to conclusions,
are you capable of distinguishing
the sound of someone periodically releasing their PTT
from the sound of someone being jammed by malicious QRM
that pulses a strong carrier at the repeater?
I suppose if someone had a vendetta against him and more specifically his message to be relayed, maybe jamming is the answer. But it only happened to him when he was passing. along. what. ever. his. message. was.
 
I suppose if someone had a vendetta against him and more specifically his message to be relayed, maybe jamming is the answer. But it only happened to him when he was passing. along. what. ever. his. message. was.
I've heard malicious QRM directed at one station in a QSO but not another.
The lids will actually monitor repeaters on the off chance that they can jam
specific ops that they hate.
 
I've heard malicious QRM directed at one station in a QSO but not another.
The lids will actually monitor repeaters on the off chance that they can jam
specific ops that they hate.
The key to jammers is to never even admit that you hear them. Act as if nothing is wrong. If the jammer is making comms impossible, just tell your buddy that you have a phone call, and end it. Call him on the phone or text him to tell him what was up. Jammers want to get a rise out of you, and want to know that they are getting to you. If you don't even mention them, then they will get bored, and bother someone else.
 
The key to jammers is to never even admit that you hear them. Act as if nothing is wrong. If the jammer is making comms impossible, just tell your buddy that you have a phone call, and end it. Call him on the phone or text him to tell him what was up. Jammers want to get a rise out of you, and want to know that they are getting to you. If you don't even mention them, then they will get bored, and bother someone else.
It's amazing how many ops of all ages are like,

"Come again, Fred? I couldn't copy you because​
there's some kind of weird static that sounds like​
tortured souls in hell calling you a 'pickle smoocher';​
what are the odds on that happening?​
Oh well, that danged ionosphere...over".​

40-yo's, 80-yo's - no matter how many times we tell them
to never acknowledge the existence or nature of malicious QRM,
there's always someone in the round-robin who has
to go on and on about what the interference sounds like.

"Let me move my antenna...​
try holding the mic at the side of your mouth...​
do you think it's intermod from WRKO's summer antenna pattern...​
can you try turning off your LED desk lamp...?​
 

“…because of the operator fatigue envolved with scanning the waterfall for our signals manually, civilian SIGINT operators are focusing on strong, wide signals. Signals which are easy to see or hear in the waterfall. Government, Military and NGOs most certainly automate the signal detection process. For them it is better to fly low and avoid the radar. Even so, from the moment our signal is detected, there is a chain of command and logistics process initiated, before any action on our signal will take place. How much time is our best guess.”

While ARRL had an announcement about use of Amateur Radio bands for illicit purposes a while back, I’m not sure if LE/Others are monitoring 2m/70cm, GMRS, FRS, etc. Maybe since Jan 6, that’s more common?


This use of radio during the highest-profile instance of right-wing extremism in decades, however, is not unique. It is part of an obscure but increasingly concerning phenomenon among the far right in recent years: using radio as a means of clandestine communication…Richard Fairburn, a retired law enforcement professional who has written on radio issues, said that law enforcement must be aware of the popularity of radio, particularly with the wave of low-cost products hitting the radio market. “Since the radios can be programmed to any frequency within their limits, some ‘unused’ or ‘black’ frequencies can be used, which would be very unlikely to be monitored by the FCC or ham operators,” he said.

Clandestine communication? Anyone with a radio can listen. And Leftists can use radios too!
 
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So, are you talking about the U.S.?

Secure for what, or from what, exactly?
 
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So, are you talking about the U.S.?

Secure for or from what, exactly?
Good questions! The needs are similar between extremists, criminals and LE/Military for Secure Comms - the latter just have more/better hardware/software to do it. The articles I’ve quoted appear to come from the perspective of prepping & SHTF, with a sprinkle of Ukraine citizen resistance.
Can??!? Weren't the Floyd riotersPeaceful Protesters coordinating using Baofengs?
Hmmm… Must have been an oversights by the Slate author in his detailed review of extremists & radios (Slate: Max Fenton is an independent researcher and journalist who studies technology, conflict, and the far right. He holds an master’s in war studies from King's College London.)
 
There are good videos out there talking about setting up a comms plan. In simplest terms you use the least amount of power as you can to get the job done, on a frequency that doesn't travel. UHF at 0.5W for shortest range, then go up from there. Then there's limiting how much you use the radio, having set check-ins (but not necessarily at the same times) with broader groups, working your way out from the smallest to the largest group.

When I looked into it, it became immediately apparent that you couldn't have one "radio guy" that figures it all out and hands everyone a Baofeng when SHTF. Everyone at least needs to know how to use the radios, when to use what, etc. You can still have the main guy to do regional traffic, but like everything else it takes coordination, training, and practice. And to reasonably train and practice, everyone should be licensed unless your plan is to rely on FRS or MURS (which is valid).

Some of the MURS radios have some nice group comms features such as squelch tones you can use to setup more "channels", "man down" features, distress beacons, "out of range" notifications, remote disable (the bad guys at Nakatomi Plaza would have liked that), etc. Icom has some nice units, and they'll charge you for them. And everyone has to have them and they all have to be programmed to work how you intend.

I'd have to look, but I think even using codewords and such to obscure your communications is not allowed by the FCC. Yeah, that sounds pretty unenforceable, just saying.
 
You really think HAM isn’t getting jammed if .gov goes full retard?
Most HTs & Portables can be “opened up”, by desoldering a resister, to RX more frequencies. TX out-of-band is, of course, prohibited. I don’t know enough about “jamming” to know if that can be avoided. Point-to-point microwave might be the best bet. This looks interesting Announcement of the new IC-905 - Icom Europe

In Ukraine, civilian spotting of Russian forces for resistance fighters was/is a risky pastime.
 
So, ...



Which is it again?
It’s knowledge and skills that serve when you don’t want others to know what you’re communicating or where you’re at when you’re transmitting. In such cases, you either have something to hide or someone to hide from. If you’re trying to hide your bank account password, that’s legit. If you're trying to hide plans to plant an IED, you're on one side or the other in an actual conflict (think Ukraine) or a Unabomber, McVeigh/Nichols sort of guy.

Thinking of NY passing laws requiring checks of your anonymous communications on social media, alternative secure means of communications are needed, although radio is not a broadly useful means.
 

Another good RTO (Radio Telephone Operator) resource. Some interesting RTO/SIGINT courses - I might sign up when I visit my son down in Wilmington, NC next year. I’m getting too old to keep up with the young’uns but can hump medic and radio gear.
 

“ KHERSON, Ukraine—During Russia’s occupation of the southern Ukrainian city of Kherson, a large electronics store served Russian forces as a field hospital, barracks and storehouse for food. One morning last summer, Ukrainian forces struck the store, completely destroying it. It was one of numerous attacks that day on Russian-controlled territory deep inside the Kherson region…

Before the blast, a small group of local Ukrainian activists had been sending photographs of the location and coordinates of the Russians over an encrypted Telegram channel to the Ukrainian military. That intelligence helped Ukrainian forces target the site, according to a military official who worked with such groups… But the channel’s members soon became a target. Russia’s Federal Security Service raided their homes and those of their relatives. Several remain imprisoned on espionage charges inside Russian-held territory, hoping a prisoner swap will set them free—although civilians, unlike members of the military, are rarely swapped.”

Being cautious wrt signal intercepts is part of the process. Being ID’s at several targeted sites is another.
 

“ KHERSON, Ukraine—During Russia’s occupation of the southern Ukrainian city of Kherson, a large electronics store served Russian forces as a field hospital, barracks and storehouse for food. One morning last summer, Ukrainian forces struck the store, completely destroying it. It was one of numerous attacks that day on Russian-controlled territory deep inside the Kherson region…

Before the blast, a small group of local Ukrainian activists had been sending photographs of the location and coordinates of the Russians over an encrypted Telegram channel to the Ukrainian military. That intelligence helped Ukrainian forces target the site, according to a military official who worked with such groups… But the channel’s members soon became a target. Russia’s Federal Security Service raided their homes and those of their relatives. Several remain imprisoned on espionage charges inside Russian-held territory, hoping a prisoner swap will set them free—although civilians, unlike members of the military, are rarely swapped.”

Being cautious wrt signal intercepts is part of the process. Being ID’s at several targeted sites is another.
Two questions on this one, not directed at you Maverick, the story just didn't give a lot of details.

"Encrypted Telegram channel" as in Telegram the phone app?

"But the channel’s members soon became a target. Russia’s Federal Security Service raided their homes and those of their relatives." Someone must have gotten caught and still had the group images/texts on their phone?
 

“…because of the operator fatigue envolved with scanning the waterfall for our signals manually, civilian SIGINT operators are focusing on strong, wide signals. Signals which are easy to see or hear in the waterfall. Government, Military and NGOs most certainly automate the signal detection process. For them it is better to fly low and avoid the radar. Even so, from the moment our signal is detected, there is a chain of command and logistics process initiated, before any action on our signal will take place. How much time is our best guess.”

While ARRL had an announcement about use of Amateur Radio bands for illicit purposes a while back, I’m not sure if LE/Others are monitoring 2m/70cm, GMRS, FRS, etc. Maybe since Jan 6, that’s more common?


This use of radio during the highest-profile instance of right-wing extremism in decades, however, is not unique. It is part of an obscure but increasingly concerning phenomenon among the far right in recent years: using radio as a means of clandestine communication…Richard Fairburn, a retired law enforcement professional who has written on radio issues, said that law enforcement must be aware of the popularity of radio, particularly with the wave of low-cost products hitting the radio market. “Since the radios can be programmed to any frequency within their limits, some ‘unused’ or ‘black’ frequencies can be used, which would be very unlikely to be monitored by the FCC or ham operators,” he said.

Clandestine communication? Anyone with a radio can listen. And Leftists can use radios too!
I worry about all of those crazy progressives arming up, and practicing. Whenever I see a soy boy type on the range, I watch em like a hawk.
 
Two questions on this one, not directed at you Maverick, the story just didn't give a lot of details.

"Encrypted Telegram channel" as in Telegram the phone app?

"But the channel’s members soon became a target. Russia’s Federal Security Service raided their homes and those of their relatives." Someone must have gotten caught and still had the group images/texts on their phone?

Yes, the phone app. I'm a novice...trying to figure Matrix:Element instead.

Later, the article mentions captured members ratting but it's not clear how they grabbed the first one(s). Crafty that the Telegram group required each member to post a short video of themselves at home before being trusted... Kind of like the "safe word" concept - if you don't say your safe-word/safe-phrase, you're not trusted. Being in the partisan resistance is not a casual venture.

I worry about all of those crazy progressives arming up, and practicing. Whenever I see a soy boy type on the range, I watch em like a hawk.

"Infiltrators" are always a risk, but more liberals become converts than risks, I'd bet. Gov't/LE can and does do undercover plants quite well, but the idea of progressive militias hasn't caught on yet. Progressive hackers are a much greater threat, as are progressive journalists.
 
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